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ABSTRACT

In this Article, Professors Bassiouni and Blakesley argue that the institution of an international criminal court would provide an effective
means of dealing with internationalproblems that are created by or
unaddressed in a unilateral or bilateral internationalsystem. Rather
than deflecting domestic concentration on law enforcement, the proposed tribunal will be a complementary and incremental effort, which
will enhance criminaljustice enforcement. The authors address several
questions concerning the implementation of the tribunal, including
questions related to sovereignty and basesfor jurisdiction,which crimes
will be within the court'sjurisdiction,which law will apply to the cases,
and practical concerns related to the court's composition, structure,
and procedure. Although an internationalcriminal court admittedly
will not be a perfect solution, the authors argue that it must not be
approached with a negative attitude, but rather with a view towards
making more effective the benefits such a court will provide. The recent
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Lybian question is a case pointing to the benefits of this court.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The idea of establishing an international criminal court (ICC) could
be said to have begun in 1899 with the First Hague Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.' In this century, an early
step toward its establishment occurred in the 1919 Versailles Treaty. 2 In
that document, the Allies provided for the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm
II for the supreme offense against the peace and for the prosecution of
German officers and soldiers who committed war crimes.' Also in 1919,
the Allies established a special commission to investigate the responsibility of acts of war. It provided for the crime against "the laws of humanity." This crime was developed in response to the killing of an estimated
one million Armenians by Turkish authorities, as well as by the Turkish
populace supported by or abetted by the state's public policy. 4 Unfortu1.
July
2.
3.
4.

International Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
19, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2d) 720.
Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43.
Id. arts. 227-29, at 136-37.
DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNA-

No. 32 (1919), reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (Supp.
1920); see generally Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and In-

TIONAL PEACE, PAMPHLET
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nately, United States opposition prevented that portion of the Commission's report from including that crime among the offenses that an international criminal court would prosecute. Subsequently, the Treaty of
S~vres, which was the Treaty of Peace between the Allies and the Turkish Ottoman Empire,5 provided for the surrender by Turkey of persons
as may be accused of crimes against "the laws of humanity." In 1927,
the Treaty of Lausanne" unfortunately gave these persons amnesty.
Between the two world wars, a wave of terror-violence developed in
Europe, mostly in connection with nationalist claims in the Balkans. As
a result, in 1937 the League of Nations adopted a Convention Against
Terrorism to which an annexed Protocol provided for the establishment
of a special international criminal court to prosecute such crimes. 7 India
was the only state that ratified it, and, as a result, it never entered into
effect. After World War II, crimes against peace, war crimes, and what

became known, with the London Charter of August 8, 1945, as "Crimes
Against Humanity" obviously needed to be addressed.8 The London
Charter established the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, which was designed to prosecute the major war criminals in the
European Theater. In 1946, a similar international military tribunal
was established in Tokyo to prosecute major war criminals in that theater of operations. 9
The drafters of the London Charter establishing the IMT at Nurem-

berg quite clearly had a great deal of difficulty formulating the Statute of

ternational Law: The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal
Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221 (1989).
5. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of S~vres), Aug.
10, 1920, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1921) (not ratified); see generally
David Matas, ProsecutingCrimes Against Humanity. The Lessons of World War I, 13
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 86 (1989).
6. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne),
July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. I (Supp. 1924); see
generally James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of
War, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 70 (1920).
7. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, opened for signature, Nov. 16, 1937, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 156 (1938); League of
Nations Doc. C.547(I)M.384(I)1937V (never entered into force), reprinted in 7 INTER-

NATIONAL LEGISLATION (1935-1937), at 878 (Manley D. Hudson ed., 1941); see generally M.D. DUBIN, International Terrorism: Two League of Nations Conventions, 19341937 (1991).
8. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288.
9. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1589, 4 Bevans 20.
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an International Tribunal and defining those crimes committed in Germany upon German citizens as "Crimes Against Humanity," at least for
pre-1939 conduct. In fact, the weaknesses of the World War II precedents plagued the legal sufficiency of the instruments and structures
sought to be created after World War II.10
The short-sightedness and xenophobic tendencies of politicians after
World War I had made impossible the advancement of international
criminal law and the establishment of an international criminal court,
which made the task of establishing Nuremberg and Tokyo more
difficult."
In this context, Adolph Hitler, making a speech at Nuremberg in
1936, commented "[w]ho after all is today speaking about the destruction
of the Armenians? 1 12 Indeed, that Hitler would make such a statement
as a prelude to his policy of extermination of Jews, Gypsys, and Slavs is
particularly revealing. This statement shows the world community's lack
of interest in effectively proscribing this conduct and in creating the appropriate international structures to enforce the laws. This gave Hilter
the comfort of an amber light, or, at least, comfort of knowing that he
might get away with this policy, as others had in the past.
The need to develop an international criminal code and an international criminal court is indispensable in the context of the transient nature of international society, the sophistication and transnational nature
of modern crime, and the ever-increasing interdependency of the new,
international world order."- As the world becomes a smaller place, the

10. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, "Crimes Against Humanity" in International Criminal
Law (forthcoming 1992); see generally Matas, supra note 5; The Nuremberg Trial and
International Law (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990).
11. The same situation arose after World War I. See CLAUD MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS (1921); JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG (1982).
12, WILLIS, supra note 11, at 173 (citing letter Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes to Kirkpatrick
of August 1939, with enclosures of Hitler's speech to Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals, August 22, 1939, Great Britain, Foreign Office, reprintedin DOCUMENTS
ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-1939 257 (E.L. Woodward et. al. eds., 3d series
1954)).
13. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987);

Symposium, Draft International Criminal Court, 52 REVUE INTERNATOINALE DE
DROIT PENAL [R.I.D.P.] 331 (1984); Draft Statute for an International Commission of

Criminal Inquiry, reprinted in

INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE

SIXTIETH CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 445 (1983); Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Court, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra, at 454. For other works on the need to establish an international crimi-

nal code and international criminal court, see HISTORY

OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR
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various parts and peoples are more interdependent and more concerned
with the same problems of international and transnational criminality.
Therefore, greater cooperation and coordination are required. This cooperation, of course, can take place at the bilateral level, but it also must
take place at the multilateral level. The member states of the Council of
Europe have realized that the bilateral level is wholly insufficient and,
since 1950, have developed a number of international conventions on interstate cooperation in penal matters to enhance their multilateral cooperative relations. 14 In recent times, the Organization of American States
has embarked on the same course of conduct based on the same premises.
The recent resolve of the major states in the world led by the United
States to establish a new international legal order predicated on consensus and collective action through the Security Council, as well as other
organs of the United Nations, is a welcome and encouraging sign, indicating that maybe the United States is willing to abandon a narrow
xenophobic perspective of unilateral or bilateral policy. 15 Collective security measures certainly must take into account the need to develop collective measures for the prevention and control of international and
transnational criminality. To a large extent, this means that, in addition
to the unilateralism and bilateralism to which the United States has in
the past been so attached, one must add the additional dimensions of
multilateralism and internationalism. As a result of this new perception
and in recognition of the growing problem of certain types of international and transnational crimes, particularly in the area of international

CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 109-120 (United
Nations War Crimes Commission ed., 1948); ANTOINE SOTTILE, THE PROBLEM OF

(1951); TOWARD
(Julius Stone & Robert. K. Woetzel
eds., 1970); Fannie J. Klein & Daniel Wilkes, United Nations Draft Statute for an
THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

InternationalCriminal Court: An American Evaluation, in
NAL LAW

INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-

526 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller & Edward M. Wise eds., 1965).

14. See EUROPEAN INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, (Ekkehart Miiller-Rappard and M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 3 vols. 1987).
15. See David D. Caron, Iraq and the Force of Law: Why Give a Shield of Immunity?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1991); Lori F. Damrosch, ConstitutionalControl of Military Actions: A Comparative Dimension, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1991); Thomas M.

Franck & Fuiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth,"
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); Michael J. Glennone, The Constitution and Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter,85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74 (1991); Theodor Meron, Prisoners of War, Civilians and Diplomats in the Gulf Crisis, 85 AM.J.INT'L L. 104 (1991);
Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?, 85 AM.
J. INT'L L. 506 (1991); Bums H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: PrecariousLegitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 526 (1991).
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terror-violence and international drug trafficking, the General Assembly
in 1989 urged consideration of the establishment of an international
criminal court.1 6 This was predicated on an initiative taken in 1987 by
the Soviet Union, which urged considerations of such a tribunal to investigate acts of international terrorism.
Thus, a dual track concern developed between 1987 and 1989 within
the United Nations: international terror-violence and international traffic
in drugs. The International Law Commission was requested to issue a
report, and a report was presented for the creation of an international
criminal court." The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly subsequently addressed the issue in 1991.

In the United States, the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act called for the
President to start negotiations on the creation of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over persons who may be engaging in acts of
international drug trafficking. This was followed in 1989 by a Resolution of the House of Representatives supporting the idea. Thereafter, the
1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill was passed, which contained a request that the President should "explore need for the establishment of an international criminal court on a universal, regional basis
to assist the international community in dealing more effectively with
criminal acts defined in international conventions."1 " In response to this
legislation, the Department of State filed a report with the Speaker of
the House of Representatives in 1991 and the United States Federal Judicial Conference filed a report with the Senate on October 28, 1991.
The American Bar Association's (ABA) interest in establishing an international criminal court dates back to 1978 in connection with various
resolutions dealing with acts of international terror-violence. In 1990,
that interest was expanded to include international traffic in drugs. In
1991, a special ABA task force on an international criminal court was
established, and the preliminary report to the House of Delegates was
issued on January 17, 1992.19

16. For the evolution of United Nations efforts, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time
has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1
(1991); see also John B. Anderson, An InternationalCriminal Court an Emerging

Idea, 15 NoVA L. REV. 433 (1991).
17. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR 42d Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at 36-54, U.N. Doe. A/45/10 (1990).
18. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-513, § 599E(b)(1), 104 Stat. 1979, 2066.
19. American Bar Association Task Force on An International Criminal Court, Preliminary Report to the House of Delegates & Recommendation (January 17, 1992) (on
file in the Office of the A.B.A. Section of International Law and Practice).
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A number of efforts have been made by other organizations in recent
times, in particular Parliamentarians for Global Action, whose membership consists of members of Parliament from every region in the world.
Distinguished members of that group, as well as others such as Senator
Arlen Spector in the United States Senate, Congressman Jim Leach in
the House of Representatives, British Member of Parliament William
Powell, have introduced various statements in their respective parliamentary bodies that were respectively reported in the Congressional Record2"
and in Hansard's Parliamentary Debates.2 1
The efforts of nongovernmental organizations also have been continuing, particularly that of the International Association of Penal Law,
which has been the leader in this field since 1926 when it introduced its
first Resolution on the establishment of an international criminal court.
The formulation of the 1937 Convention against Terrorism and the
Amending Protocol were largely developed by the then-President of the
International Association of Penal Law, Minister Vaspasian Pella, who

represented Romania at the League of Nations and who, in effect, prepared the draft of that Protocol." Subsequently, Professor Bassiouni was
commissioned by the United Nations Mission on Human Rights to prepare a Draft Statute for the establishment of an international criminal
jurisdiction to implement the provisions of the Apartheid Convention.2 3
The plan was submitted in 1980,24 but never was acted upon. A meeting
of experts was held at the International Institute of Higher Studies in
Criminal Sciences in Siracusa on June 19, 1990 to further elaborate on
this plan. A revised text was produced and submitted to the Eighth
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of
Offenders held in Havana, Cuba (August-September 1990).25 That doc-

20. See 136 CONG. REC. S8080 (daily ed. June 18, 1990) (statement of Senator
Specter).
21. HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 1033 (1991) (statement of Mr. William
Powell).
22. See supra note 7.
23. Draft Statute for the Creation of an InternationalCriminalJurisdictionto Implement the InternationalConvention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1416 (1980) [hereinafter Draft Statute].
24. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel H. Derby, Final Report on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Courtfor the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant International Instruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 523

(1981).
25.

Draft Statute InternationalCriminal Tribunal, presented by the AIDP to the

8th U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana
1990), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/NGO7/ISISC, reprinted in 15 NOVA L. REv. 374
(1991).
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ument was widely circulated and has been the object of study by the
Federal Judicial Conference, as evidenced by its October 28, 1991 report
to the Senate and by the 1991 report by the Department of State to the
House of Representatives, which referred to its participation in the
26
Siracusa meeting.
The discussion of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly about
an international criminal court in the Fall of 1991 and other governmental discussions have raised a number of questions. This Article will respond to these questions as well as to questions raised by the reports
mentioned previously.
II.

BASIC PREMISES

Any inquiry into the merits of an international criminal court must
start with resolving three basic issues:
1. Can the tribunal improve international cooperation in law enforcement, add to the capabilities of the various nations in matters of international criminal law, or contribute in any incremental way to the solution
of international and transnational criminal law problems by improving the
current practice and enhancing the effectiveness of all concerned?
2. Will the recommended system have a better or equal chance of operating as effectively as the best existing systems of national criminal
justice?
3. Will the recommended system improve efficiency and cooperation
without causing additional problems of a magnitude as great or greater
than the solutions it presents?
The first question in the establishment of an international criminal
court, therefore, relates to expectations. If the tribunal is burdened with
the unrealistic expectation that it will resolve all problems of international and transnational criminality, it is set for failure. If, on the other
hand, it is perceived as an instrument that incrementally can add to and
contribute to the solution of some of these problems, it will do so. The
proposed tribunal will not deflect domestic concentration on law enforcement, but will provide a significant incremental benefit to and a
facilitator for each domestic criminal justice system.
Second, some argue that the recommended system must function optimally, without flaws, or it should be rejected. Again, the recommendation is weighted down with the burden of being perfect or being rejected.

26. Letter to the Honorable Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary of Legislation Affairs, Dept. of State
(1991) (on file with author).
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The reality is, and the test for the viability of the system should be,
whether it will work like any other system of justice. It will have its
share of flaws and inadequacies, but overall, the system will function
well. The questions appear rhetorical and they are, except that some
critics of the recommended tribunal argue that it should not be studied,
let alone created, unless these unrealistic expectations are met. The answer is obvious and dictated by experiential logic. No system of national
or international justice, no matter how carefully planned or how well
administered, is perfect. All systems are human institutions and function
more or less well. The task is to see if this recommended institution can
work as well as domestic systems and whether it can provide benefit to
domestic systems and to the international community. Thus, the initial
premise must be that an international criminal court will not be a panacea for all ills in relation to international and transnational crime facing
the world community. Rather, the institution will be worthwhile if it
merely can provide an additional strategy to deal effectively with these
problems in a manner that is likely to produce incremental positive
results.
The third issue is whether, even with its flaws, the tribunal will enhance each participating nation's criminal justice system and promote
solutions to seemingly intractible problems of cooperation in matters of
international criminal law. Will it do this without creating problems that
are just as serious or more serious than the problems it resolve? It undoubtedly will resolve many problems in the international criminal law
arena. It will not resolve them all. The system even may create some
problems as well. The test will be whether the problems can be obviated
in the organic statute and the development of the court.
Acceptance of the premise that an international criminal court will
solve some of the problems facing the international community inevitably
leads to the acceptance of the proposition that it will benefit the international community in matters of international criminal law, as long as it
does not create problems as great or greater than those it resolves. Such
an evaluation necessarily leads to a qualified acceptance of the idea, subject to a determination of what negatives it will produce and the development of means and methods that are likely to eliminate or reduce negative consequences sufficiently to make the institution worthwhile.
This exercise leads to the examination of the various objections raised
against the establishment of an international criminal court to see
whether they can be resolved, reduced, or eliminated and whether, ultimately, the benefits exceed the potential problems. Some people are ideologically or philosophically predisposed to reject anything international;
those with isolationist premises likely will not accept even the possibility

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 25.151

of an international criminal court. We do not address those who are
ideologically or politically predisposed to rejection of the idea. We wish
to address the many legitimate questions raised in good faith by those
who support the idea, those who support studying the idea to see if it
might work, and those who may be skeptical about its validity or its
potentiality for effective implementation.
Our analytical framework will be to consider several categories of
questions that arise in relation to the development of an international

criminal court. These categories include:
1. Sovereignty and Jurisdictional Bases;
2. Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Over the Resolution of
National Criminal Justice Conflicts;
3. Crimes Within the Court's Jurisdiction;
a. the court's exclusive jurisdiction;
b. the alternative of concurrent jurisdiction on the basis of transfer of
criminal proceedings;
4. Applicable Law Regarding Substantive and Procedural Fairness;
5. Miscellaneous Issues;
a. selection of judges
b. mechanism of the court.
A.

Sovereignty and JurisdictionalBases2"

Questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction are interrelated. The first
question is whether a state can relinquish jurisdiction over certain offenses and in certain circumstances and yet remain sovereign. In other
words, can a state allow an international criminal court to have exclusive
jurisdiction over certain crimes or under certain circumstances? Furthermore, can a sovereign state surrender sovereignty to adjudicate and en-

27. Professor Blakesley places himself, as do perhaps many others interested in the
idea and the project, in category two, or perhaps a combination of all three categories: an
enthusiastic, yet moderately skeptical at least to the extent that his legal training has
made him perpetually skeptical, supporter of the project to see if it can be developed in a
manner that will be efficient, fair, and protective of human and civil rights. Professor
Bassiouni recognizes the validity of this skepticism, but is more optimistic about the prospects of finding satisfactory solutions.
28. See generally, CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY ch. 3 (1992); Christopher L.

Blakesley, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,in 2
DURE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCE-

(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986); Christopher L. Blakesley JurisdictionalIssues

and Conflicts of Jurisdiction,in LEGAL RESPONSEs TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988) [hereinafter LEGAL RESPONSES]; Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial
Crime, 73 J. CRIME L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1982).
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force certain crimes in instances when the court's jurisdiction would supersede national criminal jurisdiction. A related issue is whether the
jurisdictional bases of the international criminal court will diminish or
enhance the function of any domestic judicial system. Will it enhance or
encumber a state's capacity to provide fair and reasonably effective adjudication of those accused of international and transnational crime? Of
course, states relinquish jurisdiction to other states through extradition
or transfer of proceedings over offenses when both states may have jurisdiction. A state may decide to have another state prosecute such an offense. Allowing an international tribunal do this is not a significant leap.
A number of states are fearful of losing control of the adjudicatory or
prosecutorial process because they believe that sovereignty requires it,
that their own constitutions require it, or that this loss of control may
produce adverse results. These adverse results, in some cases, may be
predicated on that state's explicit or implicit desire to shield a given person or type of person from international adjudication for alleged international or transnational crimes. In some other cases, the reverse is true:
they fear that the adjudication will not take place or will take place in a
manner that will not serve the best interests of effective prosecution.
Some states also fear that the tribunal will be used for political purposes.
In other words, different nations have various expectations and perspectives, which change over time. Some of these expectations relate to the
nature of the offense, while others relate to the way the international
criminal court will operate. To deal with these questions at the abstract
or theoretical level would not necessarily be conducive to any valid prac-

tical results. A better starting point would begin with a pragmatic examination of the jurisdictional bases on which this international criminal
court would operate and then would seek to retrace those different jurisdictional tracks to the higher concerns of national sovereignty and international relations.
Jurisdictional bases can probably be divided into three categories:
1) The court may act as a conflict resolution mechanism over certain
crimes in cases of concurrent jurisdiction and conflicts between national
criminal justice systems.
2) The court may have concurrent jurisdiction with national criminal
justice systems, either based on:
a) a loose concurrent jurisdictional approach, or
b) a transfer of criminal proceedings from
a national criminal justice system.
3) The Court also may have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to certain offenses, certain offenders or upon certain circumstances.
Obviously, these jurisdictional bases can be exercised by an interna-
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tional criminal court and each one has its advantages and disadvantages
depending upon the goals that this kind of court seeks to achieve. Each
one of these bases, however, will be more or less opportune, depending

on the person accused and the nature of the crime alleged.
Much of the opposition to the establishment of an international criminal court is based on governmental political concerns. Some of these stem
from the desire of public officials to shield themselves and other senior
public officials, especially heads of state, from being charged before such
a court. These concerns fall into two different categories. Genuine concern and reasonable apprehension may arise that an international criminal court or its prosecutorial arm may become politicized, leading to unjustified or unwarranted accusation of public officials for political
purposes. The fear is that the court will be a mechanism for propaganda
and a means of producing political detriment to the target country or its
political administration. Concern over potential politicization can be addressed in the same manner as any prosecutorial abuse or misconduct.
Protection against abuse of power or process can be guaranteed effectively in the substance of the governing rules and the structure and
mechanism of the court as controlled in the organic statute of the court.
The protection of heads of state and other senior government officials,
however, really ought to be no less and no more than the protection
afforded any other individual who may be the subject of prosecutorial
abuse or misconduct. Moreover, with the tendency of states to expand
their own extraterritorial jurisdiction, the protection afforded by the international tribunal may be better than under the current system.
Furthermore, notwithstanding one's profession to the equal application of human rights to all individuals, political reality indicates that

some individuals will be more equal than others. Heads of states and
senior public officials will perhaps be afforded more protection. Clearly,
the more a particular crime contains a political component and the more
a given accused embodies or represents a political persuasion, group, or
state, the less likely that the court will effectively obtain subject matter
and in personam jurisdiction.2 9 Consequently, like any domestic criminal
29. See, e.g., U.S. v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (the objectives of the Panama invasion were, "to safeguard American lives, restore democracy,
preserve the Panama Canal treaties, and seize General Noriega to face federal drug
charges in the United States."); Michael Scaperlanda, The Domestic FourthAmendment
Rights of Aliens: To What Extent Do They Survive United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez?,
56 Mo. L, REV. 213 (1991); Steven B. Stokdyk, Comment, Airbone Drug Trafficking
Deterrence: Can A Shootdown Policy Fly?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1287 (1991); Phillip R.
Trimble, International Law, Foreign Policy, and the Reagan Years, 85 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1041 (1991) (reviewing DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAw oF NATIONS
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justice system, circumstances and personalities may reduce the effectiveness of an international criminal court. The converse, however, is
equally true.
This observation thus raises another important threshold question:
whether to confer jurisdiction to the international criminal court over
such international and transnational crimes that have the least political
content, or, alternatively to differentiate among the jurisdictional bases
stated above in accordance with the nature of the crime. In other words,
should the court's jurisdiction be based only on questions of jurisdictional
conflicts between states and issues of concurrent jurisdiction or else on
questions of transfer of proceedings, thus giving states an opportunity to
select the cases it will submit to the ICC and exclude compulsory jurisdiction of the court or exclude original jurisdiction with respect to certain
crimes.
Conventional and customary international criminal law recognizes
twenty-two categories of international and transnational crimes. 0 In the
order of the values they seek to preserve and the harm they seek to avert;

they are as follows: aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, slavery and slave-related practices, apartheid,unlawful human
experimentation, torture, unlawful use of weapons, piracy, hijacking and
sabotage of aircrafts, attacks against and seizures of internationally protected persons and diplomats, taking of civilian hostages, international
traffic in drugs, destruction or theft of national treasures, theft of nuclear
materials, unlawful use of the mail, cutting of international submarine
cables, bribery of foreign public officials, international traffic in obscene
materials, counterfeiting, and certain types of environmental harm. Some
of these crimes clearly cannot be committed without state action or policy, and, therefore, they are among those crimes with the highest political
content: aggression, crimes against humanity, genocide, and apartheid.
All the other crimes also can be, but are not necessarily, committed
pursuant to state action or policy, or, whenever they are abetted by state
conduct. Experience indicates that such crimes as international traffic in
drugs, taking of civilian hostages, piracy, hijacking and sabotage of airplanes, unlawful use of the mail, torture, unlawful human experimentation, bribery of foreign public officials, cutting of submarine cables,
counterfeiting, and international traffic in obscene materials usually are
committed by individuals and small groups without state action or policy

(1990)).
30. See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: DIGEST/INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985 Ivi-Ivii (1985) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES]; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 13.
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commanding, instigating, supporting, or abetting the commission of such
crimes. Others, like war crimes, since World War II, have been committed both with and without state action or policy that commands, instigates, supports, or abets such conduct. While every international and
transnational crime is capable of having a political content, however,
some by their nature cannot be devoid of it, while others by their nature
are indeed devoid of it. Such crimes, particularly when committed without state action or policy, are more likely to result in greater cooperation
between states to ensure prosecution or extradition. 3 Therefore, they are
among the types of crimes for which offenders are more likely to be
surrendered to jurisdiction of an international criminal court. This does
not mean, however, that states will be restricted in their ability to act
unilaterally and prosecute offenders. It also does not imply that two or
more states willing to cooperate in the apprehension, extradition, and
prosecution of offenders will be able to do so. The ICC merely will be
an added instrument for the effective prosecution of those cases when
states, for whatever reasons they may have, elect to have the ICC adjudicate these matters. In other words, the ICC would become an incremental or additional tool to achieve the goal of effective international prosecution without impairing the ability of states willing and capable of
doing this to act accordingly.
In addition to the nature of the crime, the personality of the perpetrator and his or her motives also play an equally important role in the
determination of the political content of the prosecution. Therefore, a
head of state engaging in drug trafficking or supporting international
terrorism for his or her personal benefit becomes a more difficult case to
prosecute, whether by a national or an international criminal court. The
Noriega case stands as a glaring example of when a single accused defendant was the catalyst for a military invasion by one country of another, with the resulting death of an estimated three thousand persons
and other grave consequences to that society, not to mention the economic costs of such an operation to the attacker and the nation attacked
and its impact on the preservation of world order.3 2
The point is that cases will always arise in which the political content
of the offense or the political personality of the accused will be a decidedly negative factor in the court's securing jurisdiction and effectively

31. See generally JOHN F. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS:
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY INITIATIVES (1985) [hereinafter MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS]; JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTER(1989).
32, See Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506; see also sources cited supra note 29.
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carrying out prosecution. These hard cases, which would face this international criminal court, however, would also face domestic criminal
courts. Those unbendingly opposed to the very idea of an international
criminal court have raised hard political cases as "straw-people" to be
knocked over and the court along with them. Setting up as a model the
hard cases is unfair because they are least likely to be resolved as a basis
to judge the ordinary operations of an international criminal court,
which is not likely to deal on an everyday basis with such hard cases.
When a case with serious political content arises, the international tribunal will have international law and the law that the party nations place
in its charter to allow it to deal with the problem.
B. Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Over the
Resolution of National CriminalJustice Conflicts
An international criminal court addressing conflicts between national
criminal justice systems can have only beneficial results on the resolution
of potential international conflicts. Such a jurisdictional function, however, by itself would not be sufficient for the establishment of an international criminal court since these matters are quite amenable to adjudication by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). So far, however, no

such cases have been brought before the ICJ. Nothing prevents the ICJ
from taking such cases until an -international criminal court is established except for the sometimes paramount obstacle of optional jurisdiction. Of course, the ICJ's jurisdiction is over states that submit to its
jurisdiction. Should an international criminal court be established, its jurisdiction will be over individuals, so mandatory jurisdiction would be
more appropriate with that specialized court and more readily acceptable. The organic treaty statute creating the international criminal court
would confer compulsory jurisdiction over the listed offenses and over
individuals alleged to have perpetrated them. This is not novel. Compulsory jurisdiction is embodied in other conventions. For example, the Vienna Convention on the Protection of Diplomats confers compulsory jurisdiction in matters of disputes over diplomatic immunity and the
33
treatment of diplomats to the International Court of Justice.

33.

The United States accepts the notion that the ICJ may have compulsory jurisdic-

tion when treaties provide for it. See MARK W.

JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-

107 (1988). Thus, the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T. 3374, 3375, 500 U.N.T.S. 241, 241, states, at article I: "Disputes arising out
of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory
jurisdiction of the [ICJ] and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an applicaNATIONAL LAW
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The benefits of compulsory jurisdiction are quite obvious, especially in
the arena of conflicting concurrent jurisdiction. One contemporary example deserves mention: the case where the United States and the United
Kingdom seek to prosecute two Libyan officials for the sabotage and explosion of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbee, Scotland. The position of the Libyan government is that it is willing to prosecute them in
Libya in accordance with and as required by its national law, which,
like that of virtually all European and Latin American nations, prohibits
extradition of its nationals. The position of the United States and the
United Kingdom is that it cannot rely on the effectiveness of national
prosecution because these individuals were part of a state structure that
engaged in such acts of international terror-violence and that they were
supported by state action or policy. The United States and the United
Kingdom argue that the duty to prosecute in this case is meaningless
because the conditions for effective prosecution do not exist. They insist,
therefore, that the individuals be surrendered by extradition or other
means for prosecution either in the United States or the United Kingdom. The Libyan case indicates the political nature of the current system. The United States and British governments certainly know that

Libya legally cannot extradite its nationals. The United States and the
British governments, however, actually might not expect extradition, but
would prefer the propaganda benefits of condemning Libya for not extraditing.3 France also has sought the same two Libyans in connection
with the sabotage and explosion of a French UTA aircraft.
Thus, three states claim jurisdiction over two individuals, and their
home state is offering to prosecute in lieu of extradition. The dispute is
not likely to be resolved. If no diplomatic solution is reached, tensions

tion made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol." See also,
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979
U.C.J. 7 (Dec. 15) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures); B. CARTER &

P.

TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW

56-75 (1991); Mark W. Janis, Somber Reflections

on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 144
(1987).
34. A similar circumstance occurred in relation to the tragic murder of Leon Klinghoffer. Although the United States Government made considerable noise about wanting
to prosecute the perpetrators, United States jurisdictional law, in 'those pre-Omnibus
Anti-Terrorism Act days, would not have llowed prosecution for murder on board a
foreign vessel on the high seas. See Robert A. Friedlander, The U.S. Legislative Approach, in Legal Responses, supra note 28, at 3; B.J. George, Jr., FederalAnti-Terrorist Legislation, in LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 28, at 25; see also Jordan J. Paust,
Federal Jurisdiction Over ExtraterritorialActs of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for

Foreign Violators of InternationalLaw Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine,
23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191 (1983).
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will increase and perhaps violence will erupt. The presence of an international criminal court would be a viable alternative to resolve such jurisdictional conflicts and could indeed lead to the peaceful resolution of
conflicts such as this. The absence of such a mechanism allows states to
remain on a conflict collision course. In this particular case, the absence
of any meaningful alternative will lead to more and more sanctions being
imposed against Libya and possibly even to violent action that could be
disruptive of world order. The absence of an international tribunal actually provides a pretext for political machinations at the expense of actual
prosecution and the rule of law.
Another instance when an international criminal court could have
solved, not only jurisdictional conflicts, but also political and diplomatic
crises that developed because of the failure to resolve the jurisdictional
conflicts is presented by the tragic Achilles Lauro seizure. In that affair,
passengers and crew were taken hostage and an innocent civilian was
killed aboard an Italian vessel on the high seas. 5 Traditional international law provides Italy with jurisdiction upon the most basic jurisdictional theory, territoriality. The citizens aboard the ship were of different nationalities. Subsequent negotiations led to the ship docking in
Egypt and the seizure of the persons who committed these crimes by
Egypt. Diplomatic negotiations led to an agreement that Egypt would
transfer custody of those individuals to the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunis for trial. Egypt pursued the agreement in good faith, but
the United States, doubting that such a trial would be effective, violated
international criminal law by commandeering the Egyptian civilian airliner carrying the accused perpetrators. The airliner was forced to land
in Italy. Thus, a diplomatic crisis developed between the United States
on the one side, and Egypt and Italy on the other, wherein the United
States used its armed forces to commandeer a plane and to force it to
land in Italian territory without Italy's permission. The accused defendants were handed over to Italian authorities and, ultimately, all but one
were tried and convicted in Italy.
Another similar jurisdictional dispute raised diplomatic tensions between the United States and Germany. It occurred in connection with
the trial of two individuals accused of hijacking TWA Flight 783 in
Lebanon. The United States sought their extradition, but Germany declined and prosecuted them instead. 8 In connection with this situation,

35.

See Gerald P. McGinley, The Achilles Lauro Case: A Case Study in Crisis Law,
LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 28, at.323.
36. See David M. Kennedy et al., The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, 31
HARV. INT'L L.J. 5 (1990).
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two German citizens were kidnapped in Lebanon by the same group of
people to whom the hijackers belonged. As a result, the absence of any
alternative to prosecution in Germany or extradition to the United States
apparently led to German vulnerability to further hostage taking and
raised tensions between the United States and Germany.
Numerous other cases of conflict of criminal jurisdiction between
states exist, as well as cases involving the unwillingness or inability of a
given state to surrender an accused for prosecution to a requesting state.
These would be the daily bread-and-butter cases of an international
criminal court. These cases arise essentially in connection with international drug trafficking and international terror-violence." The absence of
an effective conflict resolution mechanism, such as the one proposed
herein, frequently results in the unlawful abduction by the original requesting state of the individual whose surrender by means of extradition
was denied by the requested state in whose territory the individual was
found. This creates further potential conflict or disruption of friendly
relations between these two states.
Finally, complex cases of transnational criminality arise in the area of
economic and business crime, as well as in the area of money laundering,
whose commission involves more than one state and citizens and legal

entities of more than one state. These types of cases also raise conflicts of
national criminal jurisdiction in need of resolution and highlight the
need for an international criminal court having jurisdiction to try the
merits of the case. 8
The international criminal court's adjudication of questions of conflicts
of national criminal jurisdiction, as well as disputes over interpretation
of treaty obligations in international criminal law, particularly with respect to the obligation to prosecute or extradite, can only be beneficial,
even though some hard cases will arise when, just like in the national
courts, the expected positive results are not likely to be produced every
39
time.
C.

Crimes Within the Court'sJurisdiction

An international criminal court ultimately must have jurisdiction over
the merits of cases involving an international or a transnational crime.
Among the first issues to be addressed is whether the court will exercise
37. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Effective National and InternationalAction Against
Organized Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activities, 4 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 9 (1990).
38.

See, e.g.,

PROCEDURE

39. See

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
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(Ved P. Nanda & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1987).
MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS,

supra note 31, at 1-5.
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its jurisdiction only over natural persons or whether jurisdiction will be
extended over legal entities such as business entities and states. For obvious political reasons, this is not the opportune time in history to raise the
question of international criminal state responsibility and the subjection
of states to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court. That time
has not yet come, but it will as the world grows more interdependent.
Some nevertheless urge that an international criminal court would not
only have jurisdiction over individuals, but over legal entities such as
corporations. This is particularly significant with respect to economic
crimes, money laundering, and a variety of crimes that may be accomplished by individuals making use of legal entities. To some, the solution
to the problem merely would be to prosecute individuals, irrespective of
the legal entities they may use. That, however, would allow the use of
legal entities to provide individuals either with an effective shield or at
least would make prosecution more difficult if the legal entity would not
be subject to the court's jurisdiction for purposes of securing evidence or
tying down the assets and reaching other persons who, in some way, may
have aided, abetted, or participated in the commission of such a crime.
Also worth consideration is whether the international criminal court
would have some form of exclusive jurisdiction, jurisdiction concurrent
with that of states, or a combination of the two. Furthermore, which
specific crimes will be part of the court's competence within these jurisdictional bases must be determined. Therefore, all of the issues relating
to jurisdiction, substance, procedure, and politics are interrelated.
1. . The Court's Exclusive Jurisdiction
Of all the jurisdictional bases, exclusive jurisdiction is the most difficult to achieve politically. States are reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction
to an international criminal court for a variety of xenophobic reasons, as
well as legitimate political and practical concerns. States, thus, would be
unlikely to agree, in the first stage of the establishment of an international criminal court, generally to grant that court exclusive jurisdiction.
Nothing, however, precludes member states to a treaty statute establishing this court to formally grant the court exclusive jurisdiction in certain
crimes. Some states quite likely will do so with respect to those crimes
they feel may never occur on their territory, thereby allowing them to
look as if they are more responsible participants in the international
processes. That is likely to be the case with respect to a number of states
that would confer to the court exclusive jurisdiction with respect to
crimes like genocide, apartheid,or slavery. Conversely, in those states in
which these practices may exist or may have existed, they probably will
not confer such a court exclusive jurisdiction. Of all twenty-two interna-
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tional crimes,' those less likely to be the subject of original jurisdiction
are those having the highest political content, such as aggression, and
those having the largest economic interests at stake, such as environmental crimes or bribery of foreign public officials.
Admittedly, however, reticence to confer original jurisdiction upon an
international criminal court that has not yet established itself is understandable. Therefore, allowing states freely to confer or withhold jurisdiction as they may deem appropriate, by filing a declaration with the
repository of the treaty statute for the court, as well as with the court,
would be an appropriate formula. The member states, however, must
agree in advance on the list of crimes that may be the subject of such
original jurisdiction. The twenty-two international and transnational
crimes listed above"i probably would constitute the basis of that list, subject to expansion in the future as agreed upon by the state parties to the
treaty statute.
2. The Alternatives of Concurrent Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction on the
Basis of Transfer of Criminal Proceedings
These two bases are quite similar. Concurrent jurisdiction implies that
a state having jurisdiction under any of the four internationally recognized areas of jurisdiction, namely territorial, nationality, passive personality, and protected interests, would be able to exercise that jurisdiction.
It also implies that the court also would equally exercise its jurisdiction
with respect to certain defined crimes. Presumably, these crimes would
be the ones listed in the treaty statutes whether they be all or some of the
twenty-two crimes listed above."2 The problem with concurrent jurisdiction, however, is that it inherently includes the potential for jurisdictional conflict between two or more states and the international criminal
court, something that needs to be avoided.
An alternative would be the development of certain criteria for the
exercise of a right of first refusal jurisdiction by national criminal systems before the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction by the international criminal court. So many possible variations exist, however, that a
treaty statute foreseeing all the potential different forms of conflicts of
criminal jurisdiction that may arise is quite unlikely. This would be particularly true with respect to complex transnational economic crimes or
operations involving money laundering. A number of states might claim

40. See
41.
42.

BASSIOUNI,

supra note 13.

See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
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jurisdiction, each one of them relying on a different theory of domestic
criminal jurisdiction. Each state may not conceive or interpret the jurisdictional bases in the same way.
For example, a given state may claim territorial jurisdiction when one
or more of the elements of the offense occurred on its territory (subjective
territoriality), while another state could claim jurisdiction because another element of the offense occurred on its territory. Still a third state
may claim jurisdiction on the basis of the impact of the offense occurring
on its territory (objective territoriality), while a fourth may claim jurisdiction on the basis of the perpetrator's nationality, and a fifth state may
claim it on the basis of the nationality of the victim (passive personality),
and a sixth state may consider itself to have jurisdiction for having some
portions of the transactions relayed through it. Finally, another state
may claim it has jurisdiction because the offense impacted on one of its
important governmental functions or interests. Each of these claims could
obtain in one given offense. Each would be valid. Where would jurisdiction effectively lie when each one of these states can claim it? The international criminal court would also have concurrent jurisdiction because
the offense might be one of the twenty-two listed international or transnational crimes. Certainly, the existence of an international criminal
court would help to dissipate friction and competition. Problems may
still arise, however, in relation to competition among the various states
claiming jurisdiction and the international criminal court. This is precisely the sort of ambiguity that needs to be avoided if the court is to
operate successfully and obtain consensus in the international
community.
The concept of concurrent jurisdiction should be preserved. The way
to effectuate such concurrent jurisdiction, which also will fulfill a variety
of national sovereignty concerns, would be for the states to allow the
member states to transfer the proceedings or otherwise to allow the court
to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction without claiming jurisdiction.
While the transfer of proceedings mechanism has been established in
Europe, it needs to be fine tuned in order to foresee the different possible
situations in which such cases could arise and to formulate appropriate
provisions in the treaty statute to regulate its function. This mechanism
could possibly work in two ways. The first is simply for the state that
has jurisdiction on any one of the four bases stated above not to exercise
it and thus, by a de facto default, the international criminal court could
exercise its concurrent jurisdiction. The second formula would be when
the state having a jurisdictional basis undertakes affirmatively to transfer
the proceedings to the international criminal court and, indeed, to declare that it does not wish to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction in the
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case. This will avoid potential conflicts between various national criminal justice systems and the international criminal court. Obviously, in
those cases in which a state refuses to acquiesce to ICC's jurisdiction or
transfer jurisdiction and affirmatively asserts its own, thus undertaking
effective prosecution, the question becomes somewhat moot, unless the
state somehow fails to effectively prosecute and only claims to assert its
national criminal jurisdiction as a way of shielding the perpetrator either
from prosecution or adequate punishment. In this case, another state
party may bring an action before the ICC to challenge that state's action.
Such a case would imply the application of international norms of state
43
responsibility.
The types of cases that are likely to arise in this category of jurisdiction are: 1) complex economic crimes and money laundering cases, 2)
international drug trafficking cases, or 3) international terror-violence
cases.
The motivation to relinquish national criminal jurisdiction in favor of
the court's concurrent jurisdiction or to transfer proceedings once they
have begun in a national criminal justice system will be different in each
case. One can advance a number of likely motivations. First, the nature
of the crime might subject the state to some type of retaliation, harassment, or hardship because of the nature of the crime or the personality
of the actor. Such cases might arise when a state is seeking to prosecute
an individual who is engaged in an act of international terror-violence,
but may be vulnerable because a group or state supporting that individual may cause harm to the citizens of the state seeking to prosecute. For
example, if Germany had extradited the accused persons in the TWA
hijacking or transferred the proceedings to an international criminal
court, its two citizens, taken as hostages in Lebanon, may have been
spared. Germany would not have been vulnerable to blackmail if the
persons had been immediately relinquished to the custody of the international criminal court and away from Germany.44
Second, the situation of a conflict between a state seeking to extradite
and a state seeking to prosecute is also illuminated by the prior Germany-United States example. Surrender of the individual to the international criminal court would have avoided the potential conflict between
the two countries. Also, a number of cases involving surrender of individuals in international terror-violence, as well as international drug traf-

43. See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at 255, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991); IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1983).

44. See Kennedy, supra note 36.
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ficking, would be resolved by such a mechanism.
Third, a state might find itself embarrassed to prosecute a certain individual, either because the case has a political scandal component or
because it involves senior public officials, who still may have a political
following in the country and whose subsequent action during the prosecution of such senior public officials may become destabilizing. One example would have been had President Corazon Aquino, upon being
elected in the Philippines, sought to try the late President Ferdinand
Marcos in that state. Another example would have been if, after the
United States invasion of Panama, General Noriega had been returned
there for prosecution by the new government that had been established
with the support of the United States. Clearly, both of these instances
are indicative of the destabilizing effect on the state by the return of such
a prominent personality for prosecution there at a period of time in the
history of that state when this person's supporters would likely cause
political hardship to the new regime.
The bread and butter cases of the court are not likely to be the high
visibility political cases. They are likely to be cases in which the court

might render a better service because of the nature of the crime, or because of its complexity, or because witnesses may be in different parts of
the world and evidence may be scattered throughout different countries.
Most of these cases probably will involve instances when prosecution or
extradition is not likely to occur and this system thus will serve as a way
of resolving some of the problems that now arise in connection with the
difficulties of implementing the prosecute-or-extradite formulae. In some
cases, the scenario might be like Libya's desire to prosecute the two individuals sought by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France,
and, in other cases, it would be to resolve conflicts such as multiple extradition requests for one individual in a given country and the dilemma
of that state in deciding where to extradite the individual. Other cases
may involve the political inability of a given country to prosecute individuals or to extradite them to a particular country, and, therefore, surrender to the international criminal court might be the more politically
feasible and practical alternative. In short, a politically neutral forum
might prove to be the more attractive solution to countries that may find
themselves in difficulty over prosecution or extradition.
In this respect, the court would incrementally add to the international
efforts of controlling and suppressing international and transnational
criminality. Furthermore, such an international criminal court certainly
would be a desirable alternative when states are seeking the prosecution
of certain offenders, but do not have the material means to conduct an
appropriate investigation or the available evidence to conduct an effective
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prosecution. Another valuable feature in this respect is that the existence
of such a court would resolve other issues relating to the motivation of
certain states not to extradite, such as humanitarian motivations that
sometimes may be raised under the rubric of the political offense exception or the rule of non-inquiry. The existence of an alternative such as
the international criminal court certainly would allow prosecution in a
non-hostile setting and would allow a state that might have compunctions about extradition to transfer the case to the international court.
This would be a valuable mechanism for the requested state, for the
accused, and for the international community. Finally, one must not underestimate the symbolic importance of the demonstrated collective international interest and commitment to the prosecution and eventual punishment of offenders who have committed international and transnational
crimes that affect the interest and well being of the world community as
a whole.
D. Applicable Law Regarding Substantive and Procedure Fairness
Among the more serious questions raised in connection with the international criminal court's exercise of trial jurisdiction is the applicable
substantive and procedural law. With respect to the applicable procedural law, this issue is not of primary significance because international
human rights norms and standards on fairness have reached such a level
that developing a common denominator of a sufficiently high standard to
satisfy the requirements of most countries of the world is quite possible.
At this time, however, the United States stands far above and beyond all
other countries with respect to providing effective guarantees to an accused offender because of its Constitution.
As a result, some particular procedural aspects may have to rise above
existing internationally recognized norms and standards. Among those
are the questions of search and seizure, right to counsel during the critical stages of the investigation, and the right not to testify against oneself
during the investigation. During the trial, the right to confrontation and
cross examination are paramount. Perhaps of even more significance for
the United States are questions relating to trial by jury-would there be
a right to a jury trial, and, if so, what sort of jury?-burden of proof,
and protections related to evidence production and presentation at trial.
The right and mechanism for appeal also are of great import, including
whether the appeal will be a trial de novo, as in some nations of Europe
and elsewhere, or one for errors of law only. Also, will the Court have
authority to resolve the problem or merely to casser the prior judgment
in the manner of the French Cour de Cassation and other supreme
courts following the same jurisdictional basis? With the exception of the
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jury trial, evidentiary rules, and burden of proof, the international norms
and standards adopted in the draft statute for the establishment of an
international criminal court submitted to the Eighth United Nations
Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders seemingly
embodies all of these international norms and standards that would conform to the highest standards of fairness.' " Resolving all of these issues
completely is certainly important.
Substantive law questions become more difficult, especially in relation
to aspects of: (1) the general part of criminal law; (2) the special part,
namely the crimes and their elements; and (3) the penalties.4" With respect to the general part, the problem easily can be resolved by adopting
the formula that the state where the crime territorially has occurred in
all or in part will control with respect to that aspect of substantive criminal law. In this case, whether the court relies on its concurrent jurisdiction or on transfer of criminal proceedings, it will use the law of the
transferring state or the state with concurrent jurisdiction on the basis of
territoriality. In the event that multiple states are likely to exercise concurrent jurisdiction and they all have relinquished their jurisdiction to
the court, the court would apply basic rules of conflicts of laws to determine which state has the most significant contacts or relations to the
nature of the criminal transaction. This will determine the state whose
general part of the criminal law will apply. A number of rules of private
international law conflicts can apply without too much difficulty.
The state whose substantive law, the general part, applies will also
have its penalties apply. This will avoid the problem of codifying the
general part of criminal law in view of the diversity of the various national criminal justice systems and in view of the diversity of penalties. It

also provides a rational and logical nexus between the application of the
law and the imposition of penalties to the place where the crime was
committed. The notion of notice and fairness also would be satisfied by
this formula.
With respect to the special part, the creation of an international criminal code seems indispensable. The code must define and provide the substantive elements of those crimes that will be within the concurrent or
transfer jurisdiction of the court. Assuming that we are dealing with the
twenty-two international crimes listed above, an agreement on the definition of these crimes would have to be reached. 4 The reason for that is

45. See Draft Statute, supra note 23.
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that 315 international instruments deal with these 22 different categories
of crimes.48 Some of them are no longer in force; some of them are relevant for certain aspects of the crime.
Generally, the elements of the crimes are not spelled out in a fashion
required by the legality requirement of criminal law. A progressive and
harmonious codification is necessary to preserve the principles of legality
recognized in the world's major criminal justice systems. People must be
on notice of what the prohibited conduct is in order to be held accountable to conform their behavior to such standards. It also is indispensable
in order to formulate a precise indictment and to provide the defense
with an adequate opportunity to defend. Most of these crimes have already been defined in a number of conventions, and the progressive codification work that would be needed is not that significant.4 9
In fact, Professor Bassiouni has already undertaken this effort, which
can serve as a model. The International Law Commission has been engaging in this process now for a number of years in connection with
formulating a Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind.50 Unfortunately, the Commission has not had the benefit and
input of criminal law and international and comparative criminal law
experts to sufficiently be able to formulate the types of definitions that
satisfy the standards of the principles of legality, but improvements of
such a formulation undoubtedly can be made. The prospect of arriving
at a sufficient, coherent, and systematic code of offenses that will meet
criminal justice standards of legality does not appear insurmountable, in
view of the already-proposed Draft International Criminal Code"1 and

the proposed Statute of an International Criminal Court,5" if the political will to do so is achieved.
53

E. Miscellaneous Issues

Among the various miscellaneous questions that are raised are the
composition of the court and how it will function as presented in the
48.
49.

See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 30.
See sources cited supra note 13; see also Yoram Dinstein, International Crimi-

nal Law, 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 55 (1975); L.C. Green, An International Criminal
Code-Now?, 3 DALHAUSIE L.J. 560 (1976).
50. For the latest report of the International Law Commission on the work of its
43rd Session from April 29 to July 29, 1991; see U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. Supp. No. 10,
U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).

51. Draft Statute, supra note 23.
52. See id.
53. Many of these questions have been addressed in the Draft Statute International
Criminal Tribunal, id.; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 13; BASSIOUNI, supra note 16.
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Draft Statute. The Court's structure and mechanism will be as follows:
1. The Selection of Judges
Two formulas are possible to select judges. One formula is whether or
not the judges shall be appointed by each of the member states on the
basis of criteria that each country will administer, or else whether the
member states' representatives collectively will join in electing a number
of persons of the highest level of competence and integrity irrespective of
their nationality. Believing that representatives of states will not seek to
have candidates from their country elected to that position would be naive. Furthermore, believing that geographic representation and political
persuasion will not be a factor in the election of judges would be equally
naive. These considerations, however, invariably are taken into account
at the national criminal justice levels, unless we are dealing with career
civil service systems when geographic representation and political persuasion are not factors in the entry into judicial careers. In some respects, one must maintain a certain faith in the belief that even political
representatives of the member states will be more concerned with their
selection of judges because of its ultimate impact on the reputation of
that state, as well as because of their interest in insuring that the court
will have the best possible representation.
2.

Mechanisms of the Court

Probably the most important issues relating to the viability and acceptability of the Court relate to the processes of the court: namely, the
mechanisms it would employ to secure the presence of the person, to
obtain evidence to conduct investigations, and to administer both the
prosecutorial and judicial functions. Some sort of equivalent to the
United States Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, for example, must
be included. These are among the practical and fundamental questions
that we have addressed in our consideration of the possibilities of an
international criminal court. They are paramount and should be
examined.
Among the practical issues is the question of whether the court will
have its own location and what would be the facilities of such a tribunal.
Will it also have a lockup or prison in which it can keep persons? Will it
have some police force at its disposal in order to conduct investigations or
to secure the custody of persons or evidence? These are important practical questions that will be the difference between the court's success or
failure. The optimal solution obviously is for the court to have its own
site where it could be secure from likely attacks or pressures and that
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would insure the maximum security, not only of judges and personnel,
but also of security and integrity for the process.
This site could well be selected in a remote location, geographically
difficult to reach, to maximize the security elements. Many cites around
the world certainly could offer these opportunities. For example, numerous locations exist where this court could be installed on the continent of
Australia, or maybe even on numerous islands in the Caribbean or the
Pacific. Such inaccessible locations would permit the court to have its
own complex and its own detentional facilities. In the final analysis, that
would be the optimal solution. In this case, the court necessarily will
have to have police supporting personnel for investigation and for custody. No reason exists why the court would not have among its administrative personnel police officers that would be assigned to it on a permanent or temporary basis by the member states, based on a screening and
selection process that the court would establish. The screening and selection process would apply to all support personnel, including clerks, bailiffs, secretaries, and other administrative personnel.
Having investigative personnel attached to the court has several advantages. The investigative function would be controlled by means of the
treaty statute that would provide for the methods of mutual assistance
between the court and the various member states. The prosecutor general
of the court would communicate the request for mutual assistance to the
member states involved by virtue of this type of agreement. The investigating personnel would be either those working in a prosecutorial capacity in the prosecutor general's office or support personnel, among whom

would be police investigators that simply would be authorized to go into
the country from whom mutual assistance is requested and to work with
the local police authorities. The cooperation would be no different from
what it is today among nations. The model would be that administratively followed by INTERPOL in relations between collaborating states.
A number of practical details undoubtedly would have to be worked out,
but those who have some knowledge of the workings of international
organizations, as well as international criminal justice systems, would
have no difficulty setting out an administrative system for these
mechanisms.
III.

CONCLUSION

An international criminal court is both desirable and feasible. Its time
has come. It can accomplish a variety of valid and valuable functions in
the prevention and suppression of international and transnational crime.
Its acceptability, however, depends on the incorporation of protections
such as those indicated in this Article. The creation of this court, how-
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ever, requires the political will to incorporate those protections and to
accept the possibilities of this cooperative venture with a positive outlook
on what can be accomplished.
At this time, most of those who seem to oppose it are diplomatic representatives of different states who may not be sufficiently familiar with
international and comparative criminal law, and who, therefore, anticipate more problems than really exist and are apprehensive about resolving problems that do exist. Certain criminal justice officials also are opposed because they feel that unilateralism and bilateralism are the best
approaches to deal with transnational crime. Their interest in unilateralism and bilateralism, however, generally relates to transnational crimes
over which their domestic system has extended jurisdiction. They are less
interested in international crimes because these are not usually within
their competence. In that respect, they fear that an international criminal

court might be a way to reduce their role and importance or to reduce
the effectiveness of pressure on those who engage in such transnational
crimes over which they do have an interest. Their concerns are not without merit. The problem is that they raise these concerns to the level of
insurmountable hurdles. They are not necessarily insurmountable hurdles; their concerns may be resolvable.
The tribunal ought to be pursued as a cooperative and collaborative
effort, not as a replacement for current domestic and international institutions. It is an additional alternative vehicle to be applied as a facilitator
for the nation-parties to resolve problems in the arena of international
criminal law. Rational objections, like those discussed in this paper, undoubtedly are valid and legitimate. They must be addressed and resolved.
They cannot be addressed or resolved, however, in a negative, obstructionist spirit.
In other words, if the starting point is just to say "no" because it is
considered unlikely that we can move to the positive resolution of these
questions or because it is simply easier to maintain current inertia, the
outcome indeed will be unfortunate. A more propitious attitude would be
to say "yes, but. . ." and to work on the solution of the various "buts."
Lastly, an international criminal court is not to be considered as an all
or nothing proposition. It can be developed incrementally as well, provided it is given enough standing and competence to develop a record
that will permit it to gain more and more confidence and therefore expand its beneficial role. The history of the United States Supreme Court
certainly would be the evolutionary model that we would look up to
from a national perspective, but certainly the history of the evolution of

the European Court of Human Rights would be the international model
to be followed. Its success should be enough to reassure anyone who has
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had the doubts that were raised in 1950 when that court was established
and that are raised now in anticipation of the establishment of an international criminal court.
Appendix
I. Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court
A. OFFICIAL TEXTS
1. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
(Hague I), July 19, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(ser. 2d) 720, (entered into force 4 September 1900).
2. Convention Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize
Court (Second Hague, XII), signed at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, 3
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3d) 688 (never entered into force).
3. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919,
2 Bevans 43 (entered into force Jan. 10, 1920).
4. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court,
opened for signature, Nov. 16, 1937, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec.
Supp. 156 (1938); League of Nations Doc. C.547(I).M.384(I)1937v
(1938) (never entered into force).
5. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis (London Charter), Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force Aug. 8, 1945).
6. International Military Tribunal For the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (entered into force January 19, 1946).
7. Control Council Law No. 10 (Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity), adopted at Berlin, Dec. 20, 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany,
No. 3, Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946.
8. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to the
Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 31 August 1951), U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/
2136 (1952) at 23.
9. Revised Draft Statutefor an InternationalCourt (Annex to the Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Aug. 20,
1953), U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2645
(1954), at 21.
10. Draft Statute for the Creation of an InternationalCriminalJurisdiction to Implement the International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1416
(1980).
B. UNOFFICIAL TEXTS

1. Report on the Creation of an InternationalCriminalJurisdiction,by
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V.V. Pella to the Interparliamentary Union, XXII Conference, held in
Berne and Geneva, 1924, in L'Union Interparliamentaire. Compte
Rendu de la XXII Conference tenue a Berne et a Geneva in 1924,
publie par le Bureau Interparliamentaire,1925; see also L'Union Interparliamentaire. Compte rendu de la XXIII Conference Tenue a
Washington et a Ottowa en 19'25 (1925).
2. Projet D'Une Cour Criminelle Internationale,adopted by the International Law Association at its 34th Conference in Vienna, August,
1926, The InternationalLaw Association, Report of the 34th Conference, Vienna, Aug. 5-11, 1926 (1927).
3. Project of the International Association of Penal Law, in Actes du
Premier Congres Internationalde Droit Penal, Bruxelles, 26-29 June
1926 (1927) and Projet de Statut pour la Creation d'une Chambre
Criminelle au Sein de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale,
presented by the International Association of Penal Law to the League
of Nations in 1927, reprinted in 5 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT
PENAL [R.I.D.P.] (1928).
4. Constitution et Procedure D'un Tribunal Approprie pur juger de la
Responsabilite des Auteurs des Crime de Guerre, present6 a la Conference des Preliminaires de Paix par la Commission des Responsabilites
des Auteurs de la Guerre et Sanctions, III, La Paix de Versailles (1930).
5. Projectfor the Establishment of a Convention for the Creation of a
United National Tribunalfor War Crimes, established by the United
Nations War Crimes Commission, 1944. See HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

LAWS OF WAR (United Nations War Crimes Commission ed., 1948).
6. L'Union Interparliamentaire.Compte rendu de la XXVII Conference
Tenue a Rome en 1948, (1949).
7. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, in TOWARD A
FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

(Julius Stone & Robert

K. Woetzel eds., 1970).
8. Draft Statute for an InternationalCriminal Court, Foundation for
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Wingspread
Conference, Sept. 1971).
9. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Work Paper,
Abidjan World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Aug. 26-31,
(1973).
10. Draft Statutefor an InternationalCommission of Criminal Inquiry
and Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION

(1983).

11. Draft Statute International Criminal Tribunal, presented by the

182

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 25.151

AIDP to the 8th U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana 1990), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/NGO7/
ISISC, reprinted in 15 NOVA L. REV. 374 (1991).

II. Instruments on the Codification of Substantive InternationalCriminal Law
C. OFFICIAL TEXTS
1. Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal 1950, Report of the International Law Commission, Principles of InternationalLaw Recognized in
the Tribunal, July 29, 1950, U.N. GAOR 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at
11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 126
(1950).
2. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
3. Draft International Criminal Code, presented by the AIDP to the
VIth U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders (Caracas, 1980), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO 213 [Updated in M.C.
Bassiouni, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (1987)].

